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Abstract We report on a transformation from Sequential Function Charts of the IEC
61131–3 standard to bip. Our presentation features a description of formal syntax and
semantics representation of the involved languages and transformation rules. Further-
more, we present a formalism for describing invariants of IEC 61131–3 systems and
establish a notion of invariant preservation between the two languages. For a subset of
our transformation rules we sketch a proof showing invariant preservation during the
transformation of IEC 61131–3 to bip and vice versa.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we provide a formal definition of a subset of the Sequential Function Chart
(SFC) language from the IEC 61131–3 standard and the bip language. The IEC 61131–3
standard [19] describes languages widely used in the industrial control domain to write
programs for programmable logic controllers (PLC). bip [4] is a language to describe
component based systems. It is based on state transitions that are encapsulated into
components. These components are connected with each other. Via connectors they can
interact and synchronize.
We contribute a transformation specification from SFCs into bip. This transformation
is designed to preserve the behavior of SFCs while using as much of bips parallelism as
possible.
We also present a description for invariants in the SFC language and show how in-
variants from bip can be transformed into SFC invariants and vice versa. A proof that
invariant properties discovered on bip do also hold for the original SFCs is provided to
show that the transformations are correct.
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1.1 Related Approaches
Formal specification and correctness of model to model transformations have been ex-
tensively studied in the context of graph-transformations [13]. Our work, however, has
been stronger influenced by approaches to guarantee the correctness or distinct proper-
ties of compiler runs (e.g., [18, 15, 17]). Our transformation rules for the IEC 61131–3
to bip transformation can be regarded as the definition for a compiler. Guaranteeing
correctness of our transformation by using translation validation like techniques is a long
term goal of our work. This could be similar to [6].
The issue of property preservation has been studied in [16]: The work comprises
conditions and a proof that under these conditions abstractions preserve temporal logics
properties. Our transformations may be regarded as abstractions. The invariant based
safety properties studied in this paper are a simple (but yet powerful) case of these
properties.
Various other bip transformations exist that are relevant for our work. Most notably
synchronous bip [11] is a language subset of bip that is especially suitable for the trans-
formation of synchronous languages into bip. The languages of IEC 61131–3 are also
synchronous. Furthermore the translation from AADL to bip has been studied [12]. Coq
certificates guaranteeing correct invariants for bip have been studied in [8].
1.2 Lifting Safety Properties Through a Transformation Chain
On a general level we are interested in transformation chains where models get trans-
formed into other models and finally into machine code. Some analysis tool might be
invoked on one of these representations. In particular we are interested in analyses that
discover system invariants on one of the intermediate models. Safety results may be
derived from the analysis of such an invariant.
We are interested in lifting such invariants and connected safety results from one
representation to another. In particular we are interested in two different use-cases.
Use-Case 1: Lifting Invariants and Safety Properties to an Earlier Stage in the
Model Transformation Chain This comprises the lifting of invariants and connected
safety properties to the beginning of a chain of model to model transformations (cf.
Figure 1), i.e., transforming model’ to model and then invariant’ to invariant. This can
be done if the following conditions are fulfilled:
• Models at an earlier stage in the transformation chain allow at least as much
behavior as models at the analysis stage in the transformation chain.
• Invariants at the analysis stage are at most as strong as corresponding invariants
at earlier stages in the transformation chain.
The fact that invariants may only get stronger when transforming them for an earlier
model representation ensures the preservation of safety properties. However, we have to
show invariant preservation:
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Figure 1: Use-Case 1
• We have to show that for each concrete transformation invariant is indeed an in-
variant of model.
Correctness of model and invariant transformation can be formally stated in the following
way. Given a (model to model) transformation function TS and an invariant transforma-
tion function TI : for every system model there is a transformation model
′ = TS(model), if
we have discovered an invariant invariant′ for model′ (denoted model′ |= invariant′) then
there exists an invariant invariant = TI(invariant
′) such that model |= invariant. If Ti
preserves safety properties, this ensures that safety properties discovered by analyzing
I2 do also hold for the original system model.
Use-Case 2: Lifting Invariants and Safety Properties to a Later Stage in the Model
Transformation Chain In the second use-case (cf. Figure 2) we start with an invariant
invariant and connected safety properties and a model model. All we have to ensure
to guarantee the soundness (i.e., safety property preservation) of the approach are the
following two items:
• Models at an earlier stage in the transformation chain allow at most as much
behavior as models at a later stage in the transformation chain.
• Invariants at an earlier stage are at least as strong as corresponding invariants at
later stages in the transformation chain.
In this paper we are regarding transformations from the IEC 61131–3 language to bip.
Invariant-based static analysis tools like D-Finder that work on bip may be used to
discover safety properties like deadlock-freedom. These properties are also valid for the
original IEC 61131–3 model if the sketched conditions (first use-case) are fulfilled. Thus,
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Figure 2: Use-Case 2
if we have a trustable code-generation from IEC 61131–3 models and do trust D-Finder,
we can use this code generation to generate code that we can trust to be deadlock-
free given a successful D-Finder run. The other application corresponds to the second
use-case: Lifting safety properties and connected invariants from IEC 61131–3 to bip.
1.3 Overview
We define a formal semantics of the Sequential Flow Chart part of the IEC 61131–3
standard in Section 2. A summary of the bip language and its semantics is given in
Section 3. The transformation from this language into bip is described in Section 4.
Invariant preservation from bip back to the SFC language is discussed in Section 5.
The other direction: invariant preservation from SFCs to bip is presented in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 features a conclusion.
2 The SFC Language and a Formal Definition of its Semantics
This section presents an overview on the Sequential Function Charts (SFC) language
and a formal definition of SFC including the operational semantics. This formulation is
based on the IEC 61131-3 standard [19] and existing work [3, 9, 10]. We are particularly
interested in the subset of IEC 61131–3 that is used in the EasyLab toolkit [2].
2.1 A Formal Definition of the SFC Syntax
SFC is one of the graphical programming languages described in the IEC 61131-3 stan-
dard. It comprises control locations of the system (called steps) and the transition of
control between them. The passing of control can be restricted via guards. Behaviors
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of the program is described in action blocks which can be associated with steps. In the
following, we first define the basic component of SFCs and then describe the composi-
tion of them. We define in fact two formal descriptions of the SFC language. One that
supports the subset used by the Easylab toolkit and an extended version that supports
more features described in the standard.
Variables in the SFC Language SFCs have variables that are visible to all their com-
ponents, such as steps, guards and actions. We use X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} to denote the set
of variables. The current values of X are described using a variable valuation function
(usually denoted f in the context of this paper) of type X → valX , which assigns a
value compatible to the respective data type (valX) to each variable in X. We use F to
denote the set of all valuation functions of X.
Action Blocks and Steps (Extended) action blocks and steps in SFCs are the basic
units for describing the behavior.
Definition 1 (Actions) An action is an update function of type F → F .
The definition of actions is the same for extended and non-extended SFCs.
Definition 2 ((Extended) Action block) For a given set of actions A an extended
action block is a tuple (a, q), where
– a is the action, which can be either an update function of type F → F ∈ A or an
identifier to a nested SFC, and
– q is a qualifier q ∈ {N,S,R, P0, P1}, the semantics of which are introduced shortly.
A non-extended action block comprises just an update function of type F → F . In
this case, the term action block and update function may be used synonymously.
The same action can be used in multiple action blocks associated with different SFC
steps. In IEC 61131–3 the update functions can be written in any other languages defined
in the standard, such as Function Block Diagram (FBD), Structured Text (ST), Ladder
Diagram (LD) and Instruction List (IL). Here we abstract from a concrete language and
use mathematical functions instead.
The action block qualifiers describe the activity of actions. The semantics of the
qualifiers are defined as follows:
• N (non-stored) qualifier describe actions that are active only when parent steps
are activated,
• S (stored) qualifier describe actions that continue being active until a reset action
is executed,
• R (stored) actions are used for reseting active actions,
• P0 (pulse at falling edge) actions are active only when the parent step is exited,
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• P1 (pulse at rising edge) actions are active only when the parent step are entered.
The reset actions tagged with R have always the highest priority.
Definition 3 (Step) For a given set of action blocks B and its associated set of actions
A. A step of an SFC is a pair s = (n,Ω), where n is a unique identifer for the step and
Ω = 2B (note that B = A for the non-extended case) is a set of action blocks belonging
to the step. We use s.Ω to refer to the set of action blocks associated with step s.
The steps can be in inactive, ready or active state. An inactive step does not activate
any actions. The ready steps are the ones that control resides in. However, it is not
necessary that the actions of ready steps will be performed. A special situation is in
nested SFCs, where a step in a nested SFC is ready but the parent action is not active.
In this case, the actions of ready steps will not be performed. The active steps are those
ready steps whose actions will actually be performed.
Guards and Transitions Steps in SFCs are connected via transitions. Transitions fea-
ture a guard expression.
Definition 4 (Guard) A guard g is a predicate over a valuation function. It has the
type g : F → bool, where F is the set of all valuation functions. It evaluates to true if
the current values of X satisfy g.
Definition 5 (Transition) A transition t ∈ T = (tsrc, tg, ttgt) describes the moving of
control from source steps tsrc to target steps ttgt. A transition is enabled if the guard tg
evaluates to true. A transition is taken if no conflicting transition with higher priority
is enabled.
SFC Definition The definition of SFCs is the same for both extended and non-extended
SFCs. However, the set of actions has a different type.
Definition 6 (SFC) An SFC is a 7-tuple S = (X,A, S, S0, T,@,≺), where
• X is a finite set of variables,
• A a finite set of actions,
• S is a finite set of steps, comprising action blocks which depend on A (in case of
non-extended SFCs are equal to A)
• S0 is the set of initial steps,
• T ⊆ (2S\{∅})×G× (2S\{∅}) is the set of transitions, where G is the set of guards,
• @∈ A× A is a total order on actions used to define the order in which the active
actions are to be executed, and
• ≺∈ T × T is a partial order on transitions to determine the priority on conflicting
transitions.
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Figure 3: An example SFC
Example Figure 3 depicts an example non-extended SFC model consisting of four steps
and three actions. Its formal definition is:
S = {{x, y},
{S1, S2, S3, S4},
{a1, a2, a3},
{S1},
{ ({S1}, x1 < 10, {S2}), ({S1}, x > 10, {S3}), ({S2}, x > 15, {S4}),
({S3}, x < 5, {S4}), ({S4}, true, {S1}), },
{a1 @ a2 @ a3},
{t1 ≺ t2},
}
2.2 Operational Semantics of SFCs
As proposed in [3], the operational semantics for SFCs is based on configurations de-
scribing the system state 1:
Definition 7 ((extended) Configuration) An extended configuration of an SFC and
its sub-SFCs is a 5-tuple c = (f, readyS, activeS, activeA, storedA), where f is the func-
tion describing the current values of variables. The rest are four sets describing the states
of steps and actions. In particular, readyS is the set of ready steps, activeS is the set of
active steps, activeA is the set of active actions and storedA is the set of stored actions.
Non extended configurations have the following form: (f, activeS, activeA).
1In this paper, we use the term system state and configuration interchangeably
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Semantics of Extended SFCs Execution of one SFC-cycle consists of the following
three phases:
• Phase 1: execute actions contained in set activeA and update the values of variables
correspondingly;
• Phase 2: perform step transitions and update the sets readyS, activeS;
• Phase 3: compute the set of active/stored actions activeA and storedA for the
next cycle.
In each of the three phase, the configuration of the SFC system is updated. The
semantics of an SFC can then be regarded as a transition system of the configurations.
Definition 8 (Transition system of an extended SFC) An extended SFC
S = (X,A, S, S0, T,@,≺)
is associated with a transition system E(S) = (C, c0,→), where C is the set of configura-
tions, c0 is the initial configuration and →⊆ C × C is the transition relation.
Elements in the transition relation for extended SFCs have the following form:
(f, readyS, activeS, activeA, storedA)→ (f ′, readyS′, activeS′, activeA′, storedA′)
The details of the transition relation are described as follows:
• In Phase 1, f ′ is updated by performing the set of active actions, which are executed
according to the orders specified in @, that is, f ′ = (am ◦ ... ◦ a1)(f), where
a1 @ ... @ am and {a1, ..., am} are the set of active update functions. The rest of
the configuration remains unmodified.
• In Phase 2, readyS, activeS are updated and the rest of the configuration remains
the same. readyS′ is obtained by evaluating transitions T . Let c be the current
configuration, the set of transitions that can be taken can be identified as T =
{t = (tsrc, tg, ttgt) ∈ T | tsrc ⊆ activeS ∧ c |= tg ∧ (¬∃t′ . t′src ⊆ activeS ∧ c |=
g′∧ tsrc∩ t′src 6= ∅∧ t ≺ t′)}, that is, a transition is taken if its guard is satisfied and
the conflicting transitions, which are transitions originated from the same step, are
either not enabled or of lower priority. Then, the active steps for the next cycle
can be obtained as readyS′ = readyS\{tsrc|t ∈ T } ∪ {ttgt|t ∈ T }. Since actions
can be associated with multiple steps, it is also possible that actions get activated
multiple times with different qualifiers. Hence, to decide if a step or action is in
active state, we need to inspect all its activations. For that, the iterative methods
proposed in [3] can be used. From the top level SFC, the algorithm iterates over
all nested SFCs to find all active steps (activeS′).
• In Phase 3, activeA and storedA are updated and the rest of the configuration
remains the same. The iterative algorithm in [3] finds beside activeS′ also the set
of all qualifiers that appear in activations of each action. We use α(a) to denote
this set of qualifiers for action a. Then:
– activeA′ = {a ∈ A | α(a) ∩ {N,P0, P1} 6= ∅ ∧R /∈ α(a)}
– storedA′ = {a ∈ A | S ∈ α(a) ∧R /∈ α(a)}
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Semantics of Non-extended SFCs The focus of this paper is to investigate invari-
ant preservation properties for a subset of SFCs supported by EasyLab (non-extended
SFCs), in which the following restrictions are added:
– the nested SFCs are not allowed;
– only N qualifier is supported.
With these restriction, the configurations can be simplified by eliminating the sets
readyS and storedA, because readyS = activeS always holds and storedA is always
empty. The case of the entire SFC language will be addressed in future work.
Definition 9 (Transition Systems of non-extended SFCs) An non-extended SFC
is also represented as a tuple S = (X,A, S, S0, T,@,≺). Due to the simplification, the
transition relation has the form:
(f, activeS, activeA)→ (f ′, activeS′, activeA′)
For non-extended SFCs, a simplified version of operational semantics can be defined
and the set of reachable configurations can be regarded. Let JSMKSFC denote the set
of all possible configuration transitions of a non-extended SFC SM . It can be formally
defined as follows:
(c, c′) = ((f, activeS, activeA), (f ′, activeS′, activeA′)) ∈ JSMKSFC
iff
executeAction(c, c′) ∨ stepTransition(c, c′) ∨ activateAction(c, c′)
The term executeAction, stepTransition and activateAction represent the three possi-
ble types of configuration transitions. Formally,
executeAction(c, c′) =∃ aˆ ∈ activeA . f ′ = aˆ(f)
∧ activeS = activeS′ ∧ activeA′ = activeA\{aˆ}
stepTransition(c, c′) =∃ t ∈ T . tsrc ⊆ activeS ∧ tg(f) ∧ f = f ′
∧ (activeS′ = activeS \ tsrc ∪ ttgt) ∧ activeA = activeA′
activateAction(c, c′) =∃ s ∈ activeS.∃a /∈ activeA.a ∈ s.Ω
∧ f = f ′ ∧ activeS = activeS′ ∧ activeA′ = activeA ∪ {a}
The reachable configurations of SM can then be inductively defined as follows, de-
manding that the initial state is reachable and each reachable configuration must be able
to be reached from it via valid transitions.
ReachableConfigSFC(c) =
c = c0
∨ ∃c′.ReachableConfigSFC(c′) ∧ (c′, c) ∈ JSMKSFC
}
smallest fixpoint
The elements in JSMKSFC are the basic configuration transition steps of SM . For
the rest of the paper, we introduce the notation (c
SM−−→SFC c′), which means (c, c′) ∈
9
JSMKSFC , i.e., c′ can be reached from c via a single transition step contained in JSMKSFC .
Another notation (c
SM−−→
+
SFC c
′) means c′ can be reached from c via multiple of the tran-
sition steps contained in JSMKSFC .
3 BIP and its Semantics
In this section we present a subset of the bip language. bip allows the modeling of
asynchronous components and of interactions between them. We discuss its semantics
and an example bip model. Parts of this section follow the presentation given in [7]
building upon [4].
3.1 BIP models
bip (Behavior, Interaction, Priority) is a software framework designed for building em-
bedded systems consisting of asynchronously interacting components, each specified as
a non-deterministic state transition system. Tools developed for bip comprise static
analyzers and code generation.
Atomic Components bip models are composed of atomic components [4, 5]. An atomic
component (L,P, T, V,D) is a state transition system consisting of a set of locations L,
a set of ports P , a set of transitions T , and a set of variables V which are mapped to
values of type D. An atomic component has a distinct state of type
L× (V → D)
comprising a location and a variable valuation. The latter is a mapping from variables
to their values. Transitions are of type
T ⊂ L× ((V → D)→ bool)× ((V → D)→ (V → D))× P × L
They comprise a source location, a guard function, an update function, a port, and a
target location. Our semantics requires that a transition from one location to another
can be performed iff the guard function evaluates to true using the variable valuation in
the current state. During a transition the variable valuation is updated for the succeeding
state. Furthermore, it is possible to restrict transitions by putting constraints on the
port involved in the interaction.
Each port p ∈ P can have an associated variable. This variable is used to exchange
data between different atomic components in composed components (see below). The
functions V(p) : P → V ∪ {} defines the association between port and variable. If the
result of V is , the port does not exchange data.
Figure 4 shows an atomic component comprising two locations (l5 and l6), and a vari-
able θ that has a numeric value. Four possible transitions exist between these locations
which are depicted as arcs. Each one comprises a port (tick, cool, heat), a guard which
checks for conditions of the variable θ, and an update functions which is empty on two
arcs (−−) and modifies the value of the variable θ on the other arcs.
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−−
tick
l6
heat
tick
l5
θ < θmax
θ := θ + 1
cool
θ > θmin
θ := θ − 2
θ = θmax θ = θmin
−−
Figure 4: An Atomic Component
Composed Components Atomic components may be glued together to form composed
components. The behavior of the resulting system can be restricted by linking compo-
nents with connectors. These put constraints on ports in the different atomic compo-
nents. A composed component is a tuple (A,C) comprising a set of atomic components
A and a set of connectors C.
C ⊂ (A× P )× 2A×P
Connectors have the following form: ((as, ps), {(a1, p1), (a2, p2), ..., (an, Pn)}) comprising
an atomic component ax ∈ A;x ∈ {s, 1...n} and a relevant port px ∈ Pax with Pax being
the set of ports associated with ax. If the connector is used to exchange data, the data
is copied from as to all ai; i ∈ 1...n. For connectors without data exchange there is no
difference for as and ai.
In an extended version the connectors may contain guard functions, depending on the
variable valuations of the linked components, and update functions which are performed
on these variable valuations and mechanisms for value exchange between components.
Gluing components together by using connectors realizes weak and strong synchro-
nizations as well as broadcasts between components. Update functions on the involved
variable valuations are used to pass values between components.
Semantics of Composed Components The state of a composed component is the
product of its atomic components’ states: (L1× (V1 → D1)) × . . .× (Lm× (Vm → Dm)).
A state transition relation JBMKBIP is defined upon them for a composed component
BM = (A,C). We assume an indexing of atomic components A = {a1, ..., am}
(((l1, x1), ..., (lm, xm)) , ((l
′
1, x
′
1), ..., (l
′
m, x
′
m))) ∈ JBMKBIP
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iff
∃(cs, Cr) ∈ C : ∀i ∈ {1...m} :
(∃j ∈ {1...m} :
(∃p : (aj , p) = qs ∧ V(p) = vj)
∧ V(pi) = vi
∧ (li, gi, fi, pi, l′i) ∈ ai.T
∧ gi(xi)
∧ x′i = fi(xi)[vi ← xj(vj)]
∧ (ai, pi) ∈ ({cs} ∪ Cr))∨
(li = l
′
i
∧ ¬(∃p : (ai, p) ∈ ({cs} ∪ Cr))
∧ xi = x′i)
ai.T denotes the set of transitions associated with component ai
Reachable States of BIP models The set of reachable states for a bip model BM for
a given initial state s0 is defined by a predicate RBM via the following inductive rules:
RBM (s0)
RBM (s) (s, s
′) ∈ JBMKBIP
RBM (s
′)
The first rule says that the initial state is reachable. The second inference rule captures
the transition behavior of bip using the transition relation.
3.2 An Example
Figure 5 shows a temperature control system modeled in bip, which has been well dis-
cussed in the literature (e.g., [5, 1, 14]). It uses the component from Figure 4 but puts
constraints on the ports in order to use it as a controller.
The system controls the cooling of a reactor by moving two independent control rods.
Each one has its own timer t1, t2. After the usage of a rod there is a timeout tmax until
it can be reused again. The goal is to keep the temperature θ between θmin and θmax .
When the temperature reaches the maximum value, one of the rods has to be used for
cooling. The bip model comprises three atomic components: one for each rod and one
for the controller. Each contains a state transition system. Transitions can be labeled
with guard conditions, valuation function updates, and a port. The components interact
via ports thereby realizing cooling, heating, and time elapsing interactions. In the figure,
possible interactions are indicated by arcs connecting ports from different components.
These require that either in every connected component a transition labeled with the
connected port must be taken in parallel or none of these transitions is taken. For
example, the time elapsing tick transitions must be taken in each component in the
same parallel step (tick1 , tick , and tick2 ). Depending on the values of θmax , θmin , and
tmax the system might either contain a deadlock or not.
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Rod2
tick
l6
heat
tick
l5
θ = θmin
θ < θmax
θ := θ + 1
cool
θ > θmin
θ := θ − 2
θ = θmax
t1 := t1 + 1
tick1
tick1
cool1
t1 := 0
rest1
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l2
tick2
tick2
l3
l4
cool2 rest2
t2 := 0
t2 := t2 + 1
tick tick2tick1
rest1 cool1 cool heat rest2 cool2
t1 ≥ tmax t2 ≥ tmax
Rod1 Controller
Figure 5: Temperature Control System
Let us introduce two invariants for the example model with θmax = 1000, θmin = 100,
and tmax = 3600:
1. I1 ≡ (atl5 ∧ 100 ≤ θ ≤ 1000) ∨ (atl6 ∧ 100 ≤ θ ≤ 1000)
This invariant states that the temperature will always be between 100 and 1000.
2. I2 ≡ (atl1 ∧ t1 = 0) ∨ (atl3 ∧ t2 = 0) ∨ (atl5 ∧ 101 ≤ θ ≤ 1000)∨
(atl6 ∧ (θ = 1000 ∨ 100 ≤ θ ≤ 998))
This invariant states that the timer in one of the rods is zero or we are in the
heating phase and the temperature is already above 100 or we are in the cooling
phase and the temperature is 1000 or between 100 and 998.
ati is a predicate denoting the fact that we are at location i in a component. The first
invariant is restricted to a single component, the second one combines facts about several
components.
4 Transformation from SFCs to BIP
This sections describes the transformation rules from the SFC language to bip.
For a given SFC S = (X,A, S, S0, T,@,≺, h), the transformed bip model can be
represented by a composed component B = (Aˆ, Cˆ), with Aˆ ⊂ L×P×T×V ×D being the
set of atomic components and Cˆ ⊂ (Aˆ×P )×2Aˆ×P the set of connectors. In the following
sections, we first describes the atomic components including their formal definition (4.1),
and afterward the transformations steps and connections of atomic components (4.2).
SFC evaluation phases As introduced in Section 2.2, execution of an SFC is done in
SFC cycles, which consists of three phases:
1. execution of active actions,
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2. evaluation of transitions and identification of active steps,
3. identification of active actions for the next cycle.
In the generated bip model, an SFCManager component is introduced to enforce syn-
chronization of the phases. This is done with the wTick (work tick), tT ick (transition
tick) and fT ick (finish tick) signals.
4.1 Atomic Components
Several transformation templates can be identified for the transformation of SFC ele-
ments into bip elements.
Actions Each SFC action a ∈ A will be represented by a bip component aˆ ∈ Aˆ. Each
action has two ports for synchronization with the bip representation of the SFC program.
The work port starts the action. Then it reads all input data, processes the data and
writes the output value. At last is enables the done port to signal its ACB (see next
paragraph) that it has finished processing.
To access global variables, the action has a readx and/or a writex for each variable
x is accesses. They are connected to the read and write ports of the global variable
atomics.
Action Control Blocks For an action component aˆ ∈ Aˆ transformed from an SFC ac-
tion a ∈ A, a special atomic component called Action Control Block (ACB) is equipped,
which is responsible for collect and evaluate qualifiers from action activations to decide
if the action will be executed for the next SFC cycle. We use bˆa to denote the ACB
component created for aˆ and Bˆ for the set of ACB components for all actions.
Transformation 1 (Action Control Block)
CreateACB(a) : A→ L× P × T × L× V ×D
CreateACB(a) = (LACB, PACB, TACB, L0ACB , VACB, DACB)
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with the following substitutions:
LACB = {ACTIV Ea,WORKa,WORKEDa,WAITa}
PACB = {wTicka, tT icka, Na, Sa, Ra, worka, donea}
TACB = {
(ACTIV Ea, true, {}, tT icka,WAITa),
(WAITa, true, {e← (¬r ∧ (s ∨ n)); s← (¬r ∧ s); r ← 0;n← 0},
wT icka, ACTIV Ea),
(ACTIV Ea, e, {}, worka,WORKa),
(WORKa, true, {}, donea,WORKEDa),
(WORKEDa, true, {}, tT icka,WAITa),
(WAITa, true, {n← 1}, Na;WAITa),
(WAITa, true, {r ← 1}, Ra;WAITa),
(WAITa, true, {s← 1}, Sa;WAITa),
}
L0ACB = {WAITa}
VACB = {na : bool, sa : bool, ra : bool, ea : bool}
DACB = {0, 1}
A graphical representation can be found in Figure 6. Each ACB contains a set of
boolean variables r, n and s, which are set to true if the respective qualifiers R, N and S
appeared in the previous SFC cycle. At the end of the previous SFC cycle, the collected
qualifiers are evaluated to determine if the action will be executed (by computing e) and
if it will be stored (by computing s). In the beginning of the current SFC cycle, the
ACB is triggered to ACTIV E by wTick signal. Then, the associated action is executed
by sending the work signal if the boolean variable e computed from the previous cycle
is true. When the execution of all actions finishes, the SFC manager triggers all ACBs
to the WAIT location by tT ick signal, in which action activations for next SFC cycle
are collected. The fT ick signal triggers the ACBs to back IDLE locations at the end
of current SFC cycle.
For non-extended SFCs, the ACB component can be simplified. Unused variables r, s
and n can be eliminated and gathering of quantifiers can be modeled as a simple location
transition. Figure 7 is such a simplified guard component.
Steps A step in SFC s ∈ S is represented by an Atomic bip Component sˆ ∈ Sˆ defined
as follows.
Transformation 2 (Step)
CreateStep(s) : S → L× P × T × L× V ×D
CreateStep(s) = (LStep, PStep, TStep, L0Step , {}, {})
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ACTIVE WAIT
WORK WORKED
wTick
{ e=(!r && (s || n));
   s= (!r && s);
   r=0; n=0;
}
N
{n=1;}
tTick
tTick
done
work
[e]
wTick tTick S
work
done
RN
S
{s=1;}R
{r=1;}
Figure 6: bip Atomic Component for an Action Control Block
ACTIVE WAIT
WORK WORKED
wTick
N
{e=1;}
tTick
tTick
done
work
[e]
wTick tTick N
work
done
ENABLE
N
wTick
Figure 7: bip Atomic Component for an Action Control Block for Non-extended SFCs
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Figure 8: Transformation of an SFC Step into bip
with the following substitutions:
LStep = {DISABLEDs, ACTIV Es, ACTIONs}
PStep = {tIns, tOuts, fT icks, acts}
TStep = {
(ACTIV Es, true, {}, tOuts, DISABLEDs),
(DISABLEDs, true, {}, tIns, ACTIV Es),
(DISABLEDs, true, {}, fT icks, DISABLEDs),
(ACTIV Es, true, {}, fT icks, ACTIONs),
(ACTIONs, true, {}, acts, ACTIV Es),
}
L0Step = {DISABLEDs}
A graphical representation can be found in Figure 8b.
The tIn and tOut Ports are used to enable and disable the steps; fT ick is used for
synchronization within the SFC evaluation phases. The act port is used to activate
actions.
After the tT ick has been sent by the SFC manager, the step transition guards (in-
troduced later) will evaluate all transition conditions. For an enabled transition, the
bip components representing the set of source steps will be forced from ACTIV E to
DISABLED by receiving the tOut signal from the guard. Similarly, the set of bip
components representing the target steps are triggered to ACTIV E location. Further
on, on receiving the fT ick, activation signals are sent to ACBs of actions associated
with active steps.
Guard For each step transition t = (tsrc, tg, ttgt) ∈ T in SFC, a guard tg is associated.
This guard is built as an atomic component tˆg ∈ AˆG in the bip domain. The definition
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of the guard atomic component is as follows:
Transformation 3 (Guard)
CreateGuard(t) : T → L× P × T × L× V ×D
CreateGuard(t) = (LGuard, PGuard, TGuard, L0Guard , {}, {})
with the following substitutions:
LGuard = {WAITt, READt, GUARDt, ACTt, DONEt}
PGuard = {valt, guardt, tT ickt, fT ickt, actt}
TGuard = {
(WAITt, true, {}, tT ickt, READt),
(READt, true, {}, valt, GUARDt),
(GUARDt, true, {}, fT ickt,WAITt),
(GUARDt, g, {}, guardt, ACTt),
(ACTt, g, {}, actt, DONEt),
(DONEt, true, {}, fT ickt,WAITt)
}
L0Guard = {WAITt}
The most important part of the guard is g, which represents the condition for this guard.
Because the conditions may differ, a BIP guard component has to be customized for each
SFC guard. Also, access to variables has to be added. The sample in Transformation 3
just reads one variable val. Figure 9b contains a graphical representation of the sample
guard.
In WAIT location the guard is waiting for begin of the second phase (port tT ick),
in which it first reads the global variables that are necessary to evaluate g. Then, if
the condition g evaluates to true, the guard port is activated. If the transition the
guard is connected to can be taken, the guard component moves to ACT . The guard
port is connected to the tIn/tOut Ports of the bip components that represent predeces-
sor/successor SFC steps. The location ACT is introduced to activate actions with P0
and P1 qualifiers, respectively. The activation ports are connected to the N ports of the
associated actions. Note that for both P0 and P1 activations, the activation ports of a
guard send actually a N activation. This is because the behavior of P0/P1 activation
is the same as that of N activations, except that P0/P1 activations are only enabled
during step transitions. The second phase of an SFC cycle is finished with fT ick. In
Figure 9b a graphical representation of a guard component is presented.
For non-extended SFCs, the qualifier P0 and P1 is not used and associated activation
port can be eliminated. Figure 10 shows a bip guard component for non-extended SFCs.
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Figure 9: Transformation of a Guard Component
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DONE
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[g]
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guard
Figure 10: The bip Guard Component for non-extended SFC
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SFC Manager The SFC Manager component, displayed in Figure 11, enforces the
synchronization of the SFC execution phases by periodically enabling its wTick, tT ick
and fT ick ports:
Transformation 4 (SFC Manager)
mˆ = (LM , PM , TM , L0M , {}, {})
LM = {WORKm, TRANm, DONEm}
PM = {wTickm, tT ickm, fT ickm}
TM = {
(WORKm, true, {}, tT ickm, TRANm),
(TRANm, true, {}, fT ickm, DONEm),
(DONEm, true, {}, wT ickm,WORKm)
}
L0M = {DONEm}
Synchronization is done by connecting all wTick, tT ick, fT ick ports of all components
that need the signal.
The three phases are:
• WORK: This phase is started by the wTick. During this phase all enabled actions
are executed by their action control blocks. During this phase the actions read
global variables (including input data), process them and write the results back.
The results don’t get valid in this phase.
• TRAN: This phase starts with the tT ick. With the tT ick the results of the actions
get valid. Afterwards the conditions of the guards are evaluated and, if possible,
taken. SFC Actions that are called with the P0 or P1 action qualifiers are marked
in their ACB during this phase.
• DONE: The third phase is initiated by the fT ick, after all possible transitions have
been taken. In this phase all actions that should be executed in the next round are
determined by evaluating the action qualifiers. The ACB stores this information.
Variables The bip language does not support global variables that are accessible to all
components. Hence, an SFC variable x ∈ X is encapsulated as an atomic bip component
Global Variable (GV) defined in the following:
Transformation 5 (Global Variable)
CreateGV(x) : X → L× P × T × L× V ×D
CreateGV(x) = (LGlobal, PGlobal, TGlobal, L0Global , VGlobal, DGlobal)
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Figure 11: SFC Manager
read write
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tTick
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wTicktTick
Figure 12: Global Variable
with the following substitutions:
LGlobal = {READx,WRITEx}
PGlobal = {readx, writex, tT ickx, fT ickx}
TGlobal = {
(READx, true, {}, readx, READx),
(READx, true, {tx = writex.v}, writex, READx)
(READx, true, {vx = tx}, tT ickx,WRITEx)
(WRITEx, true, {}, readx,WRITEx),
(WRITEx, true, {}, wT ickx, READx)
}
L0Global = {READx}
VGlobal = {tx, vx}
DGlobal = Z
The GV component contains two variables t and v, both are of the same type as the
corresponding SFC variable. The variable v hold the actual value of the SFC variable
21
tOut
ACTIVE
DISABLED
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wTick
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Figure 13: SFC Starter
whereas t is a temporary buffer. Initially, the GV component is in READ location, in
which reading of the variable value is allowed and writing of the variable is buffered
in t. The buffer value is written to v on receiving the tT ick signal, that is, when all
actions has been performed. This guarantees that all actions read the consistent value
of v. On the other hand, the buffered value is written immediately with the tT ick, so
that the guard components can read the up-to-date value of variables and evaluate the
transition conditions correctly. The wTick brings the GV back to WRITE location.
Figure 12 is the graphical representation of the GV component, in which write.v is the
value exchanged via the write port.
Starter This component activates the initial steps of the SFC program:
Transformation 6 (Starter)
CreateStarter(r) : S0 → L× P × T × L× V ×D
CreateStarter(r) = (LStarter, PStarter, TStarter, L0Starter , {}, {})
with the following substitutions:
LStarter = {DISABLEDr, ACTIV Er}
PStarter = {tOutr, wT ickr}
TStarter = {
(ACTIV Er, true, {}, tOutr, DISABLEDr),
(DISABLEDr, true, {}, wT ickr, DISABLEDr)
}
L0Starter = {ACTIV Er}
Figure 13 contains a graphical representation of the component. The wTick is needed
to ensure that the initial step is activated before any word is done.
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Figure 14: Initial Step
F2X
Xw
read
write
Xr
Figure 15: Use of Global Variable X in F2
4.2 Transformation Steps
The following describes the steps necessary to convert an SFC program to a compound
bip component. All created instances of atomics are added to A.
For each global variable x ∈ X we create an instance of the bip Global Variable atomic
component xˆ:
AˆX := {xˆ := CreateGV(x)|x ∈ X}
For each Action a ∈ A create an instance aˆ of it in bip.
AˆA := {aˆ := CreateAction(a)|a ∈ A}
For each Action a ∈ A create an instance of ACB component bˆa in bip and connect the
work and done ports correspondingly (see Figure 16b).
AˆB :=
{
bˆa := CreateACB(a)|a ∈ A
}
CˆA :=
{((
bˆa, work
)
, {(aˆ, work)}
)
|aˆ ∈ AˆA
}
∪
{((
bˆa, done
)
, {(aˆ, done)}
)
|aˆ ∈ AˆA
}
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Figure 16: Action
For each SFC Step s ∈ S instantiate the bip Step component sˆ.
AˆS := {sˆ := CreateStep(s)|s ∈ S}
For each initial step s ∈ S0 create a bip Starter instance rˆs and create a connector to sˆ
(Figure 14).
AˆS0 := {rˆs := CreateStarter(s)|s ∈ S0}
CˆS0 :={((tˆs, tOut), {(sˆ, tIn)})|ts ∈ AS0}
For each SFC transition (tsrc, g, tdst) = t ∈ T create a guard component gˆt in bip
and connect it to tOut of tsrc and tIn of ttgt. If the reading of variables is needed
for evaluating the condition, necessary read ports, locations and transitions are created
according to Figure 9.
AˆG := {gˆt := CreateStarter(t)|t ∈ T}
CˆT :=
⋃
(tsrc,tg ,ttgt)=t∈T

(gˆt, guard) , ⋃
s∈tsrc
{(sˆ, tOut)} ∪
⋃
s∈ttgt
{(sˆ, tIn)}

Connect all actions and guards to global variables if necessary (see Figure 15).
CˆX :=
⋃
(xˆ,aˆ)∈AˆX×AˆA
{((xˆ, read) , {(aˆ, xˆr)}) , ((aˆ, xˆw) , {(xˆ, write)})}
∪
⋃
(xˆ,gˆ)∈AˆX×AˆG
{((xˆ, read) , {(aˆ, xˆr)})}
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Figure 17: Transition
For each step s ∈ S create a connector to the ACB bˆ of all actions it activates. Use the
port of the ACB according to the action qualifier. For the P0/P1 qualifier connect the
N port of the ACB to the guards act port.
CˆB :=
⋃
s∈S

(sˆ, act) , ⋃
(a,q)∈s.Ω
q∈{N,S,R}
{(
bˆa, q
)}

∪
⋃
(tsrc,tg ,ttgt)=t∈T

(gˆt, act) , ⋃
(a,P0)∈s.Ω
s∈tsrc
{(
bˆa, N
)}
∪
⋃
(a,P1)∈s.Ω
s∈ttgt
{(
bˆa, N
)}

Create an instance of the SFC manager component mˆ and connect the wTick, tT ick
and fT ick ports to all components that expect these signal.
CˆM :={((mˆ, wT ick), {(aˆ, wT ick)|aˆ ∈ AˆB ∪ AˆX ∪ AˆS0})}
∪{((mˆ, tT ick), {(aˆ, tT ick)|aˆ ∈ AˆB ∪ AˆG ∪ AˆX})}
∪{((mˆ, fT ick), {(aˆ, fT ick)|aˆ ∈ AˆS ∪ AˆG})}
Putting everything together
Aˆ :=AˆX ∪ AˆA ∪ AˆB ∪ AˆS ∪ AˆS0 ∪ AˆG ∪ {mˆ}
Cˆ :=CˆX ∪ CˆA ∪ CˆS0 ∪ CˆT ∪ CˆB ∪ CˆM
B :=(Aˆ, Cˆ)
In the following some samples for the transformation of transition are provided.
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Figure 18: Divergence
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Figure 19: Convergence
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Figure 20: Parallel Divergence
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Figure 21: Parallel Convergence
Figure 17 shows a simple transition from one step to the following step. In bip tOut
of the source step and tIn of the destination step are connected together with a guard
the checks the condition.
An alternative branch is shown in Figure 18. Here we have one connector and a
single guard for each branch in bip. Depending on which guard evaluates true first the
associated following step is taken. Figure 19 shows the opposite. Two branches are
united. In bip each branch has one connection to tIn of the following step.
A parallel branch (Figure 20) looks similar to an normal transition, expect that it
connects one source step with two following steps. It has also just one guard. The merge
of parallel branches is shown in Figure 21. The connector can only switch, of all source
steps are active and the guard evaluates to true.
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5 Invariant Preservation of the SFC to BIP Transformation
In this section, we formally define and prove our invariant transformation function.
We consider in this work only the non-extended SFCs. Given such an SFC S =
(X,A, S, S0, T,@,≺) and the transformed BIP model B = T (S), the invariant trans-
formation function TI takes an invariant on a BIP model and returns an invariant on an
SFC model. Our final goal is to prove that B |= Iˆ → S |= TI(Iˆ) holds. By definition,
an invariant is a predicate on configurations that holds for all reachable configurations.
The set of reachable configurations of SFC and BIP is defined in Sections 2.2 and 3.1,
respectively.
The BIP model B = (A, C) transformed from S contains a set of atomic components
A = AˆX ∪ AˆA∪ AˆB ∪ AˆS ∪ AˆS0 ∪ AˆG∪{mˆ}. The system state (configuration) of any BIP
model can be denoted as cˆ = (atl, σ), where atl : A → L is a function that returns the
current location of each component and σ is function that returns the current value of
variables in each component. The notion var(sˆ) denotes the set of variables of component
sˆ and sˆ.v denotes the particular variable v of component sˆ.
General Proof Sketch We divide the proof of invariant preservation for model trans-
formation into two steps. In the first step, we introduce a relation R(c, cˆ) between a
reachable configuration c in the original SFC model and a reachable configuration cˆ in
the transformed BIP model. Our first proof goal is to show that for each SFC transition
(c, c′) ∈ JSMKSFC , we can always find the corresponding BIP configuration pair (cˆ, cˆ′)
such that R(c, cˆ) ∧ R(c′, cˆ′) ∧ (cˆ BM−−→
+
BIP cˆ
′), where cˆ BM−−→
+
BIP cˆ
′ is true if their exists a
sequence of transitions contained in JBMKBIP that transforms cˆ to cˆ′. This property
guarantees that the behavior in the SFC domain can always be traced in the BIP do-
main. Our proof goal in the second step is to show that the invariants are preserved for
two configurations in the relation R.
Let’s first assume that the two proof goals discussed above are true. Consider an
arbitrary invariant Iˆ in BIP and the transformed predicate TI(Iˆ) in SFC domain, we
want to show that TI(Iˆ) is indeed an invariant of the original SFC model. For that, we
need to show that TI(Iˆ) holds on each reachable configuration of the SFC. According
to the first proof goal, for an arbitrary reachable configuration c in an SFC, we can find
a configuration cˆ in BIP such that R(c, cˆ) holds. Since an invariant must hold for all
configurations by definition, Iˆ must also hold for cˆ. The second proof goal then states
that the predicate TI(Iˆ) holds for c. Thus, we can conclude that for any invariants in
BIP, the transformed predicate is an invariant of the corresponding SFC.
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The relation R can be formally defined as follows:
∀c = (f, activeS, activeA), ∀cˆ = (atl, σ), R(c, cˆ) holds iff
rule1(c, cˆ) ∧ rule2(c, cˆ) ∧ rule3(c, cˆ), where
rule1(c, cˆ) = ∀ s ∈ S, sˆ ∈ AˆS . s ∈ activeS ≡ ¬(atl(sˆ) = DISABLE)
rule2(c, cˆ) = ∀ a ∈ A, aˆ ∈ AˆA, bˆa ∈ AˆB . a ∈ activeA ≡ (σ(bˆa.e) = 1)
rule3(c, cˆ) = ∀ x ∈ X, xˆ ∈ AˆX . f(x) = σ(xˆ.v)
The first step of the proof is to shown that both G1a and G1b holds:
G1a : R(c0, cˆ0)
G1b : ∀c, c′, cˆ . c SM−−→SFC c′ ∧R(c, cˆ)
→ ∃cˆ′ . cˆ BM−−→
+
BIP cˆ
′ ∧R(c′, cˆ′) ∧BM = T (SM)
The second step of our proof is to show that for all configuration pairs in the relation,
the invariant is preserved. Formally, the second proof goal G2 is:
G2 = ∀c, cˆ . R(c, cˆ) → (∀Iˆ . cˆ |= Iˆ → c |= TI(Iˆ))
where Iˆ is a invariant in BIP model and TI is the invariant transformation function that
maps Iˆ to an invariant in SFC domain. The notion cˆ |= Iˆ means cˆ satisfies Iˆ.
Proof of G1a The proof that G1a = R(c0, cˆ0) holds can be done based on the model
transformation rules:
• for each initially active step, a starter component is added in the BIP model, which
triggers the step component to the ACTIV E location (rule1 fulfilled);
• no action should be active in c0 and the initial value of variable e in the ACB
blocks are set to false (rule2 fulfilled);
• the value of variable v of GV components are initialized according to the SFC
variables (rule3 fulfilled).
Based on the above transformation rules, it can be trivially shown that the R(c0, cˆ0)
holds.
Proof of G1b For the subgoal G1b, we make a case distinction on three possible types
of transitions of the SFC.
1. In an executeAction transition, some action a is executed which updates the value
of SFC variables. An action can be executed only if it is active, hence, a ∈
activeA. In the corresponding BIP model, the SFC manager enforces that all
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action execution is performed between the fT ick of the previous cycle and the
tT ick of the current cycle. Let aˆ be the action component and bˆa be the ACB
component created for a. Since the relation R(c, cˆ) holds, the e variable in bˆa
is true according to rule2. From the structure of ACB component (Figure 7),
we can see that bˆa can be on the ENABLE, IDLE or ACTIV E location. In
all cases, the transition from location ACTIV E to WORK will be taken after
next wTick signal. This transition triggers the execution of action component aˆ,
which performs the same set of operations as specified in a, because the model
transformation just copies those operations. The transition also set the value of
bˆa.e to false. Execution sequence of the actions in the BIP model is guaranteed
to be the same as in original SFC model, since transition from location ACTIV E
to WORK in each ACB component is prioritized according to the order @. Let
cˆ′ be the BIP configuration in which the action aˆ is just done (bˆa in WORKED
location). It can be easily seen that rule2 in the definition of relation R holds
for (c′, cˆ′). On the other hand, since tT ick interaction has the lowest priority, no
tT ick is issued during the transition from cˆ to cˆ′. So, no step component goes to
location DISABLE, which means rule1 holds for (c
′, cˆ′). In addition, the relation
R(c, cˆ) says that the current values of variable v in GV components are the same
as that of SFC variables X. Hence, the input of operations in aˆ is the same as that
of a. Since component aˆ doesn’t contain any internal variables, the output values
will be the same, thus rule3 holds for R(c
′, cˆ′). We can conclude that we reach an
configuration cˆ′ such that R(c′, cˆ′) holds.
2. In a stepTransition, the set of active steps is updated by taking some enabled
transition t and the rest of the configuration is not affected. According to the op-
erational semantics of SFCs, step transitions are performed after execution of all
active actions identified from the previous cycle. In the transformed BIP model,
we achieve this point after the tT ick signal. At this moment, all ACB compo-
nents are in WAIT location and all guard components are ready to read values
from GV components. Let tˆg be the guard component created for t. Accord-
ing to the relation R(c, cˆ), the variable values of GV components are the same
as SFC variables X. This guarantees that, if t can be taken in the original
SFC model, the condition g in the tˆg component must evaluate to true. Dur-
ing model transformation, the transitions from location ACT to DONE in all
guard components are assigned to higher priority than fT ick, hence, the interac-
tion ((tˆg, guard), {(sˆ1, tOut), ..., (sˆn, tOut), (sˆ1, tOut), ..., (sˆm, tOut)}) will be taken
before next fT ick signal, where {sˆ1, ...sˆn} are BIP atomics created for steps s ∈ tsrc
and {sˆ1, ..., sˆm} are the corresponding components for steps s ∈ ttgt. This inter-
action triggers all source steps of transition t to DISABLE location and triggers
all target steps of t to ACTIV E location. It can be easily shown that the rule1
of relation R is fulfilled after this interaction. On the other hand, in both SFC
and BIP model, the set of active actions and the values of variables do not change.
Thus we reach a configuration cˆ′ such that R(c′, cˆ′) holds.
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3. The third type of SFC configuration transition is the computation of active actions,
which is the last phase in an SFC execution cycle. In the transformed BIP model,
we reach this point after an fT ick interaction. The relation R(c, cˆ) says that for
each active step in the SFC, the corresponding step component in BIP must not
in DISABLE location. Hence, before the next wTick, all active steps compo-
nents will activate the associated actions (Figure 8), since wTick interaction has
the lowest priority. According to the model transformation rules, for each action
contained in the set Ω, a connector is constructed that connects the activation port
of the step component with the ACB component. Thus, the set of active actions
will be the same in both SFC and BIP models, given the set of active steps are the
same. This guaranteed that rule2 holds. Since the rest part of the configuration
doesn’t change in both models, we reach a configuration cˆ′ such that R(c′, cˆ′) holds.
As shown above, for all types of configuration transitions in SFC, the proof goal G1b
holds. Note that we made the implicit assumption in our proof that we either use the
same datatypes for both SFC and BIP model or no overflows and underflows of value
ranges occur.
Before we present a proof of G2, a formalism for describing the invariants in SFCs
and BIP models is needed, which is presented in the following paragraphs.
Invariants on SFC The syntax of an SFC invariant can be expressed as follows:
I ::= i ∧ i
i ::= i′
i′ ::= i′ ∨ i′
i′ ::= i′′
i′′ ::= ¬i′′
i′′ ::= C | AS| AA
C ::= cond(X)
AS ::= s ∈ activeS
AA ::= a ∈ activeA
Where cond(X) is a predicate on the set of SFC variables X. For an SFC, we can stati-
cally analyze the model and find the activation relation between steps and actions, which
can help us to express the invariants in SFC models. Let SN (a) = {s ∈ S | a ∈ s.Ω}
denote the set of steps associated with an action a. A structural invariant that holds for
all non-extended SFCs is:
 ∨
s∈SN (a)
s ∈ activeS
 ∧ a ∈ activeA
 ∨
 ∧
s∈SN (a)
¬(s ∈ activeS)
 ∧ ¬(a ∈ activeA)

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This invariant says if at least one step that can invoke the action a is in active state,
the action a is also in active state, otherwise a is not active.
Invariants on BIP Models An invariant in a BIP model can be expressed using the
following syntax:
Iˆ ::= i
i ::= i ∧ i
i ::= i′
i′ ::= i′ ∨ i′
i′ ::= i′′
i′′ ::= ¬i′′
i′′ ::= C | L | C ∧ L
C ::= cond(var(sˆ))
L ::= atl(sˆ) = l
where atl(sˆ) = l is true if the component sˆ is at location l, and cond(var(sˆ)) is a
predicate on the variables of sˆ. The structure of this invariant language reflects the
invariant generated by D-Finder [5]. Some examples are given in Section 3.2.
Invariant Transformation From the previous definition, we see that any BIP invariant
can be written as logical expressions of two basic sets of elements: predicates on variables
of individual component and predicates on locations of individual components. We
introduce an invariant transformation function TI , which takes an BIP invariant Iˆ and
returns the corresponding invariant in the SFC domain. It is defined inductively:
TI(Iˆ1 ∧ Iˆ2) = TI(Iˆ1) ∧ TI(Iˆ2)
TI(Iˆ1 ∨ Iˆ2) = TI(Iˆ1) ∨ TI(Iˆ2)
...
As it can be seen, the function TI keeps the structure of BIP invariants and maps each
elementary BIP predicate to a corresponding predicate in the SFC domain. Given a
BIP model B = T (S) transformed from an SFC model S, the mapping of elementary
predicates on B to predicates on S is described using following rules. The notion sˆ.L
denotes the set of all locations of BIP atomic sˆ.
1. For a predicate on variables p = cond(var(sˆ)) we distinguish the following cases:
• if sˆ is a GV component created for SFC variable x, sˆ has only two variables
v and t by definition. Since the relationship between v and t is a simple
assignment, the condition can be written in the form condt(t) ∧ condv(v).
Then, the corresponding predicate in SFC domain is TI(p) = condv(x), i.e.
we ignore the condition on t and apply the condition on v to SFC variable x;
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• if sˆ is a ACB component, it contains a boolean variable e. The predicate p
is a boolean expression on these variables. Let a be the corresponding SFC
action that sˆ is created for, the transformation of p is done by keeping the
structure of expression and doing the replacement: TI(e) = a ∈ activeA;
• if sˆ is an other component, TI(p) = true. Actually, this rule is not used,
since only GV and ACB component contain variables according to the model
transformation rules.
2. For predicates on locations we distinguish the following cases:
• if sˆ is a step component, TI(atl(sˆ) = DISABLE) = ¬(s ∈ activeS) and
TI(atl(sˆ) = l) = s ∈ activeS,∀ l ∈ sˆ.L\{DISABLE}, where s is the step in
SFC that sˆ is transformed from;
• if sˆ is a ACB component created for SFC action a, TI(atl(sˆ) = ENABLE) =∨
s∈SN (a)
s ∈ activeS and TI(atl(sˆ) = l) = false, ∀l ∈ sˆ.L\{ENABLE};
• if sˆ is other component, TI(p) = false.
In the invariant transformation procedure, some unused predicates on locations are
eliminated by setting them to false in the transformed SFC invariant. This is safe because
the BIP component invariants have a disjunction form as mentioned before.
Example. For an ACB component sˆ (Figure 7), an obvious invariant can be found as:
Iˆ = ¬(atl(sˆ) = ENABLE)∨ (atl(sˆ) = ENABLE ∧ e). By applying the transformation
rules, we can obtain I = (¬ ∨
s∈SN (a)
s ∈ activeS) ∨ (( ∨
s∈SN (a)
s ∈ activeS) ∧ a ∈ activeA),
which is an invariant contained in the example SFC structural invariant we found before.
Another set of invariants that can be identified in BIP models are interaction in-
variants. Let’s consider a BIP model transformed from a simple SFC shown in Figure
17. The transformed BIP model consists of (besides other necessary components) two
step atomics and one guard atomic. A connector {(S3, tOut), (S4, tIn), (Guard, g)} is
built by the transformation. The interaction described by the above connector is en-
abled if atl(S3) = ACTIV E ∧ atl(S4) = DISABLE ∧ atl(Guard) = ACT ∧ Guard.g
hold. An obvious interaction invariant that can be observed is that one of S3 and S4
must be in DISABLE location, i.e. atl(S3) = DISABLE ∨ atl(S4) = DISABLE
must hold. By applying the transformation rules, the predicate in SFC domain is
¬S3 ∈ activeS ∨ ¬S4 ∈ activeS, which obviously holds by the semantics of SFC.
Proof of G2 The proof of second goal comes strait forwardly from the definitions
of R and TI . Consider a configuration c of an SFC model and a configuration cˆ of
the transformed BIP model, we now show that if R(c, cˆ) holds, then for an arbitrary
invariant Iˆ |= cˆ in the BIP domain, the transformed predicate I = TI(Iˆ) holds for c in
the SFC domain. Since I and Iˆ have the same structure, it is sufficient to show that all
the elementary predicates in Iˆ evaluates to the same value as the transformed predicates
in I. We make a case distinction on the two types of predicates. The first type are
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predicates on variables of some component sˆ. We can see from the model transformation
rules only the GV and ACB component contains internal variables. The rule2 and rule3
in the definition of R guarantees that the predicates before and after transformation TI
evaluate to the same result. The second type are predicates on locations. As stated in
the definition of TI , only the predicates on step components and ACB components are
kept. For the case of step components, the rule1 guarantees the correctness. For the
case of ACB components, the correctness comes from the structure of the ACB: when
we move to the ENABLE location, at least one step component has interacted with the
ACB via the activation port, which means at least one step component must be active
in the first place.
6 Transformation of SFC Safety Requirements into BIP
Invariants
The BIP framework provides a set of invariant-based formal verification tools. An im-
portant usage scenario is using these existing tools to verify safety properties on the
BIP level. Invariants discovered on BIP to show the absence of deadlocks fall into this
class of properties. However, some safety requirements may already be specified on the
original SFC models. For that, besides transforming the SFC model into BIP, we also
need to translate these requirements into BIP domain.
A safety requirement specifies typically a set of non-safe configurations in the SFC S
that should be never be reached. Here we provide a solution to ensure the unreachability
of unsafe configurations. We define a translation function. It has the form TR : C → P
and takes an SFC configuration c ∈ C and returns a predicate p ∈ P on the transformed
BIP model B. Since the BIP model specifies more behavior, a translated predicate are
not necessarily a single BIP configuration but can be a set of configurations.
This property translation function TR can be defined as follows:
TR((activeS, activeA, f)) =
∀s ∈ activeS . ¬(atl(sˆ) = DISABLE)
∧∀a ∈ activeA . bˆa.e = 1
∧∀x ∈ X . σ(xˆ.v) = f(x)
After translating the safety requirements, one has to ensure that it does indeed hold
in the bip domain. Verifying that such a safety requirement is fulfilled is equivalent to
showing B |= ¬p where p is a predicate specifying the unsafe configuration. This means
¬p is an invariant of the system.
The transformation function stated above is safe because the returned invariants in
the bip domain are at most as strong as the corresponding invariants in the SFC domain,
as discussed in Section 5.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this report we presented the formalization of the transformation from the SFC lan-
guage of the IEC 61131–3 standard into bip. Furthermore, we have presented transfor-
mations for invariants over IEC 61131–3 to invariants over bip and vice versa. These
transformations are accompanied by a correctness proof which is based on the semantics
of the involved language.
The drawbacks of this work comprises the fact that our proof only deals with ab-
stract transformation rules. We did not achieve a verified implementation yet. We are
currently implementing the transformations in Java using the Eclipse Modeling Frame-
work 2. Regarding correctness guarantees, we are working on a certificate generation
and checking infrastructure similar to those described in [6, 7, 8].
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